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Employment Discrimination
by Peter Reed Corbin*
and
John E. Duvall**
The 1999 survey period was another active year for employment
discrimination litigation in the Eleventh Circuit and before the United
States Supreme Court.' In addition to the many cases decided by the
Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court rendered several key decisions
defining the scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act and redefining
the concept of sovereign immunity. The Court also set standards for
punitive damages awards under Title VII. Each of these decisions are
discussed in detail below.
I.

TITLE

VII

OF THE

CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

OF

1964

A.

Jurisdiction
Since its inception in 1964, Title VII has never applied to small
employers. Indeed, it excludes from the definition of "employer" those

* Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1975); University of Virginia
(B.A., 1970). Member, State Bar of Georgia and The Florida Bar.
** Partner in the firm of Ford & Harrison LLP, Jacksonville, Florida. Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1985); Florida State
University (B.S., 1973). Member, The Florida Bar.
1. This Article covers significant cases in the area of employment discrimination law
decided by the United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit during 1999. Cases arising under the following federal statutes are
included: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999)); the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West
1999 & Supp. 1999)); the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)); and the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866 and 1871 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. III 1997)).
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employers with fewer than fifteen employees. 2 In Scarfo v. Ginsberg,3
the issue before the Eleventh Circuit was the following: in situations in

which there is a dispute over whether a defendant meets the definition
of "employer" under Title VII, is this a question to be resolved by the
jury or by the court? Defendants were several corporations, all owned
or partially owned by the same individual. None of these corporations
individually employed the requisite fifteen employees, but if all the
corporations were grouped together as a single employer, clearly Title
VII would apply. Even though the facts were disputed as to whether the
various corporations were so interrelated as to constitute a single
employer, the district court made factual findings on this issue because
it related to subject matter jurisdiction. Finding that defendants did not
constitute a single employer, the district court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.4 In a split decision, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed and held
that the issue of whether defendants constituted an employer within the
definition of Title VII was a "threshold jurisdictional issue."5 The court
further found that when faced with factual disputes concerning the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction, it was proper for the district court, rather

than the jury, to weigh the evidence and serve as the factfinder.'
B.

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

1. Direct Evidence. In the typical disparate treatment case under
Title VII, the plaintiff proceeds under one of two basic models of proof:
(1) direct evidence of discriminatory intent; or (2) the familiar McDonnell
Douglas circumstantial evidence model.7 In two cases decided during
the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit grappled with the issue of what

constitutes direct evidence of discrimination. Interestingly, although the

2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(b) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. . .
3. 175 F.3d 957 (11th Cir. 1999).
4. Id. at 959-60.
5. Id. at 961.
6. Id.
7. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this model the
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. If the
plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, then the defendant must come forward with
admissible evidence articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision. If the defendant satisfies this burden, the plaintiff then must establish that the
employer's proffered reason is false, or pretextual, and that intentional discrimination was
the real reason for the adverse employment decision. Id. at 802-05; Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,252-56 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 505-12 (1993).
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intent was to settle a confusing area of the law, the court ended up
merely confusing the issue even more.
In the first case, Schoenfeld v. Babbitt," plaintiff brought claims of
race and gender discrimination against the United States Department
of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service relating to the Service's refusal to
hire plaintiff for a biologist position. The district court granted
summary judgment for the Service on both claims.9 On appeal the
Eleventh Circuit addressed whether plaintiff had presented direct
evidence of discrimination. The court found that direct evidence of
discrimination is evidence that, "'if believed,'" proves the issue of
discrimination "'without inference or presumption.'"'0 Relying on its
prior decision in Carter v. City of Miami," the court concluded that
direct evidence was composed of "'only the most blatant remarks, whose
intent could be nothing other than to discriminate' on the basis of some
impermissible factor." 2 The alleged direct evidence consisted of three
different statements made by persons involved in the hiring process."
The Eleventh Circuit agreed that "[a]lthough these statements suggest
discrimination, they are not the type of 'blatant remarks' from which
discrimination can be found without the aid of an inference." 4
However, because the court also found that plaintiff had presented
sufficient circumstantial evidence of gender discrimination to create a
disputed issue of material fact, it remanded that portion of the case for
trial.' 5
In Wright v. Southland Corp.,6 the Eleventh Circuit adopted a
different definition of direct evidence of discrimination. Plaintiff brought
claims under both the ADEA and Title VII, alleging that he was
discharged because of his age and was retaliated against for filing an
EEOC charge. The district court granted summary judgment for
defendant on both claims.' 7 On appeal, in a lengthy and scholarly
opinion authored by Judge Tjofiat, the court attempted to clarify the
definition of direct evidence (an issue that the court noted had "baffled

8.
9.

168 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1260-64.

10. Id. at 1266 (quoting Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 125 F.3d

1390, 1393 (l1th Cir. 1997)).
11. 870 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1989).
12.

168 F.3d at 1266 (quoting Carter, 870 F.2d at 582).

13. Id.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1270-71.
187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1289.
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courts and commentators for some time")," but the end result is that
the issue is now confused even more. The court referred to the definition
of direct evidence from Schoenfeld as the "dictionary definition" of direct
evidence.' 9 However, the court adopted an entirely different definition
that it labeled the "preponderance definition" of direct evidence.2 °
Under this definition, direct evidence is evidence "from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find, more probably than not, a causal link
between an adverse employment action and a protected personal
characteristic." 2' This is a much lower threshold than the "blatant
remark" type of direct evidence required in Schoenfeld and, indeed,
would mean that the vast majority of employment discrimination suits
involve direct evidence of discrimination. Interestingly, however,
although the other judges on the panel in Wright concurred in the result
(finding that there was sufficient disputed evidence to warrant reversal
of summary judgment), both judges expressly stated that they did not
join Judge Tjoflat's opinion.22 Accordingly, it is questionable as to
what, if any, precedential value this case has.
2. Sexual Harrassment. Two cases decided during the survey
period addressed the ever-troublesome issue of sexual harassment in the
workplace. The first case, Dees v. Johnson Controls World Services,
Inc.,2 addressed the issue of whether defendant took adequate remedial measures in response to a complaint of sexual harassment. Plaintiff
was employed as an office coordinator within defendant's fire department. Defendant had a contract with the United States Navy to provide
fire protection, security, and related services to the submarine base
located at Kings Bay, Georgia. Over a period of three years, plaintiff
was subjected to a continuous barrage of sexual harassment by the fire
chief and assistant chief. The harassment took a variety of forms,
including sexually explicit stories, jokes, comments about body parts,
and physical harassment. Plaintiff finally lodged a formal complaint
with the Human Resources Department, which, after an ensuing
investigation, resulted in plaintiff being transferred to a new position
with no loss in salary or benefits and both harassers being fired. In
response to plaintiff's subsequent sexual harassment action under Title
VII, the district court granted summary judgment, finding that

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id. at 1298.

22.
23.

Id. at 1306 (Cox, J., specially concurring); id. (Hull, J., specially concurring).
168 F.3d 417 (11th Cir. 1999).

20001

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

1127

defendant was not liable because it had taken prompt remedial
action.24 On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit focused on evidence
that defendant had notice of the harassing conduct well before plaintiff's
formal complaint and had taken no action (such as a comment from a
Human Resources employee that the alleged harassers were "up to their
old tricks again" and that the same type of complaints involving the
same individuals had been investigated several years earlier)."
Finding the issue of prior notice to be a disputed issue of material fact,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further
proceedings.26
In the second case, Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit,
in an en banc decision, addressed the level of proof necessary to support
a claim for sexual harassment based on a hostile environment. The
district court granted defendant's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a
matter of law. 28 Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,29 the court noted that hostile environment
claims include both a subjective and an objective component.3 ° With
respect to the objective component, the court identified the following four
factors that the Supreme Court said should be considered in determining
whether the harassment was sufficiently pervasive to alter an employee's terms or conditions of employment: "(1) the frequency of the
conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
(4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's job
performance. " "
The court found factors two, three, and four to be completely
absent.32 The court also found that factor one was for the most part
lacking. 33 The court summarized the evidence as follows:
(1) one instance in which [the harasser] said to [plaintiff] "I'm getting
fired up"; (2) one occasion in which [the harasser] rubbed his hip
against [plaintiff's] hip while touching her shoulder and smiling; (3)

24. Id. at 418-21.
25. Id. at 422-23.
26. Id. at 423.
27. 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The panel decision, reported at 158 F.3d
1171 (11th Cir. 1998), was discussed in last year's survey article. See Peter Reed Corbin
& Richard L. Ruth, Employment Discrimination,50 MERCER L. REV. 969, 982 (1999).
28. 195 F.3d at 1241.
29. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
30. 195 F.3d at 1246.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1247-51.
33. Id. at 1249.
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two instances in which [the harasser] made a sniffing sound while
looking at [plaintiff's] groin area and one instance of sniffing without
looking at her groin; and (4) [the harasser's] "constant" following and
staring at [plaintiff] in a "very obvious fashion."lu
The court noted that other circuits had found that more severe
harassing conduct failed to meet the threshold of what was considered
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of
employment. 35 Thus, the court agreed that the district court had
properly entered judgment as a matter of law. 6
In a stinging and emotional dissent, Judge Tjoflat (joined by three
other judges) criticized the majority opinion as a "model of how not to
reason in hostile environment sexual harassment cases." 37 Exemplary
of Judge Tjoflat's theme is the following:
It is a mystery to me how the court could find that the sniffing
sounds, in particular, "are hardly ... humiliating." The majority
brushes over this piece of evidence lightly, but one wonders what
response, if not humiliation mixed with indignation, would be appropriate for a situation in which a woman's supervisor at work feels the
need to stare at her groin while making sniffing sounds.'
Judge Tjoflat concluded that such conduct was not just "uncivil," and
"may be illegal," but that "at the very least," plaintiff should have been
39
able to present her claim to a jury.
3.
Retaliation. In Sullivan v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.,40 plaintiff sued Amtrak under Title VII, claiming both sexual
harassment and retaliation stemming from an incident in which he
alleged that his supervisor sexually propositioned him in a hotel parking
garage. Plaintiff also alleged that, after complaining about the
harassment, Amtrak retaliated against him by eliminating his position
and failing to rehire him in other management positions. At trial the
jury entered a defense verdict on the sexual harassment claim but
awarded plaintiff fifty thousand dollars in compensatory damages on his
retaliation claim. 41 On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit re-

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1247.
Id. at 1251-52.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1257 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).

38. Id. at 1260 n.5.

39. Id. at 1269.
40. 170 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 1999).
41. Id. at 1057-58.
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versed.4 2 The court found that Amtrak had presented legitimate
reasons for its actions (plaintiff's job was eliminated as part of a
nationwide restructuring) and that with this showing, any presumption
of retaliation disappeared.43 The court concluded that the evidence was
"far too speculative to support the jury's conclusion" that plaintiff had
been retaliated against."
C.

Employer Defenses

1. Mixed-Motives Defense. The availability of the mixed-motives
defense was before the court in Pulliam v. Tallapoosa County Jail.45
Plaintiff brought an action under Title VII, alleging that the county had
unlawfully terminated him in retaliation for filing a prior EEOC
complaint.46 At the close of the evidence, the district court submitted
several special interrogatories to the jury, including the following: "Do
you find, by preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant would
have made the same decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment
notwithstanding the fact that he filed a charge of race discrimination
and retaliation?"47
After the jury answered "yes" to this interrogatory, the district court
entered judgment for defendant.4" On appeal the Eleventh Circuit,
citing the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,49
found that in an employment discrimination or retaliation case, even
after the plaintiff produces evidence that the defendant was partially
motivated in making an adverse employment decision by an impermissible consideration, "the defendant can [still] prevail if it can prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
decision even in the absence of the discriminatory consideration."0 The
court agreed that because sufficient evidence had been presented

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
185 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1184.
Id.

49. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality opinion).

50. 185 F.3d at 1184. Interestingly, the court did not mention the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which partly overruled Price Waterhouse. After the 1991 Act, an employer
establishing the mixed-motives defense can avoid liability for monetary damages (not
including attorney fees) and reinstatement but cannot avoid a finding of liability altogether.

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
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supporting the instruction, the district court had not erred in giving
it.5 Further, even though defendant had not raised the mixed-motives
defense in its answer, it had not waived the defense because it was
found to have been sufficiently asserted before the close of the evidence.5 2
2. Collateral Estoppel. In Maniccia v. Brown,5" the Eleventh
Circuit considered the preclusive effect of findings in a prior administrative hearing. Plaintiff was employed as a deputy sheriff for Santa Rosa
County, Florida. She was fired for (1) obtaining confidential driver's
license information from the Florida Crime Information Computer
("FCIC") for an acquaintance who then used the information for a
private corporation; (2) transporting an unauthorized passenger in her
patrol car without requesting authorization; and (3) lying about both
offenses. She appealed her termination to the Santa Rosa County Civil
Service Board. Following a hearing at which plaintiff was represented
by counsel, the Civil Service Board found that plaintiff had committed
the charged offenses and that the county had just cause to terminate
her. She then filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the circuit court,
but the court denied the petition. In her subsequent Title VII action
alleging that she was discriminated against because of her sex, the
district court granted summary judgment for defendant, finding that
plaintiff was estopped from arguing that she did not violate county
policies or lie, in view of the findings in the administrative and state
court proceedings.54 On appeal the Eleventh Circuit agreed.55 Citing
the Supreme Court's decision in Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Corp. ,5 the court found that "[a] state court's decision upholding an
administrative body's finding has preclusive effect in a subsequent
federal court proceeding if: (1) the courts of that state would be bound
by the decision; and (2) the state proceedings that produced the decision
comported with the requirements of due process."57 The court then
found that "Florida courts recognize the preclusive effect of state court
decisions upholding administrative determinations."58 The court also
found that plaintiff had adequate due process because she was repre-

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
So. 2d

185 F.3d at 1189.
Id. at 1187.
171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1366-67.
Id. at 1366.
456 U.S. 461 (1982).
171 F.3d at 1368.
Id. (citing School Bd. of Seminole County v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 522
556, 556-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
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sented by counsel both before the Civil Service Board and in state
court.59 Finding no other evidence that plaintiff was treated differently
than similarly situated males, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.6 °
3. Sovereign Immunity. The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida6 ' has spawned a sequence of Eleventh
Amendment challenges to virtually every statute governing the arena of
employment discrimination. Whether the Eleventh Amendment bars
disparate impact claims against states under Title VII was the issue
before the court in In re Employment DiscriminationLitigationAgainst
the State of Alabama.6 2 This action involved several race discrimination cases against the State of Alabama that were consolidated by the
district court, all of which were asserting various types of disparate
impact claims. The district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss
on Eleventh Amendment grounds but allowed defendants to appeal the
decision by issuing an appropriate order under Rule 54(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.6 On appeal the Eleventh Circuit found that
"[ulnder Seminole Tribe v. Florida, Congress may abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity, but it can only do so if: (a) Congress 'unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity,' through 'a clear
legislative statement;' and (b) Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid
exercise of power.'

"'

As to the first prong, the Eleventh Circuit, relying on the "clear
precedential guidance" provided by the Supreme Court's decision in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,6" had little difficulty "in concluding that Congress
unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity when it amended Title VII [in 1972] to cover
state and local governments." 6 The court also had little difficulty with
the second prong of the Seminole Tribe test. Finding that the disparate
impact provisions of Title VII were closely aligned with constitutional
equal protection analysis, the court "conclude[d] that in enacting the
disparate impact provisions of Title VII,

...

Congress has acted

59. Id.
60. Id. at 1370.
61. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
62. 198 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999). In Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (11th Cir.
1999), the Eleventh Circuit found that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a national
origin claim against the Alabama Department of Public Safety brought under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 511.
63. 198 F.3d at 1309-10.
64. Id. at 1316 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55) (citation omitted).
65. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
66. 198 F.3d at 1317.

1132

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

pursuant7 to a valid exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power."6

D. Remedies
1. Punitive Damages. In a case of monumental importance to all
employment discrimination litigation, the Supreme Court in Kolstad v.
American Dental Ass'n," addressed the showing required for a plaintiff
to obtain punitive damages under Title VII. Although this case was
brought under Title VII action, it will undoubtedly be used in future
cases brought under the ADA and other employment discrimination
statutes. When Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, added
punitive damages as one of the available remedies under Title VII, it
provided that punitive damages could be obtained when the defendant
was shown to have acted "with malice or with reckless indifference to
the federally protected rights."89 The issue before the Court in Kolstad
was whether, to be subject to punitive damages, it also had to be shown
that defendants had engaged in independent, egregious conduct. 7 The
Court noted that evidence of such egregious conduct would no doubt be
a part of most plaintiffs' evidence in establishing the required state of
mind (acting with malice or with reckless indifference) but declined to
require an independent showing of egregious conduct to obtain punitive
damages.71 However, the Court did add an important defense for
employers with respect to punitive damage claims. The Court held that
in addition to the required state of mind showing, a plaintiff also must
impute liability for punitive damages to the employer under principles
of agency. 72 The Court concluded,

Recognizing Title VII as an effort to promote prevention as well as
remediation, and observing the very principles underlying the Restatements' strict limits on vicarious liability for punitive damages, we agree
that, in the punitive damages context, an employer may not be
vicariously liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of
managerial agents where these decisions are contrary to the employer's
good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII. 73

67. Id. at 1324.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
119 S. Ct. at 2124.
Id.
Id. at 2126.
Id. at 2129 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In the wake of this holding, all employers would be well advised to
review their policies prohibiting discrimination, disseminate those
policies, and provide training programs to implement and teach those
policies to establish a clear record of their good-faith efforts at compliance with Title VII and to avoid potential punitive damages liability in
future employment discrimination litigation.
2. Compensatory Damages. In West v. Gibson,74 the Supreme
Court was presented with the relatively narrow question of whether the
EEOC possesses the legal authority under Title VII to award compensatory damages in discrimination cases involving federal government
agencies. The Seventh Circuit ruled that the EEOC does not have this
authority, thus creating a split among the circuits.75 Examining the
"language, purposes, and history" of both the 1972 amendments to Title
VII (which extended the Act's coverage to the federal government), as
well as the 1991 amendments to Title VII (which added compensatory
damages to the available remedies), the Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, concluded that the EEOC does have the authority to award
compensatory damages against federal agencies.76
3. Consent Decree. In United States v. City of Miami,77 the
Eleventh Circuit addressed the latest chapter in consent decree litigation
involving the City of Miami Police Department that has been occurring
since 1977. This latest proceeding involved two civil contempt actions
against the City of Miami for reverse race discrimination in its
promotion practices involving promotions to a lieutenant position and to
a sergeant position. Both positions were awarded to black candidates
pursuant to the consent decree. The district court found that the city
violated the consent decree by engaging in reverse race discrimination
and held the city in civil contempt. The district court also awarded
broad "make-whole" relief to all twenty-three lieutenant candidates and
all twelve sergeant candidates who were vying for the promotions.7"
On appeal the only issue was whether the district court's broad remedial
relief constituted an abuse of discretion. In reviewing the evidence, the

74.
75.

119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999).
See Gibson v. Brown, 137 F.3d 992, 996 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Crawford v.

Babbitt, 148 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussed in Corbin & Ruth, supra note 27,
at 986). But see Fitzgerald v. Secretary, United States Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d
203, 207 (5th Cir. 1997).
76. 119 S. Ct. at 1909-12.
77. 195 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 1999).
78. Id. at 1294.
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Eleventh Circuit concluded that, although twenty-three lieutenant
candidates and twelve sergeant candidates were bypassed for promotion,
it was almost impossible to determine which of the twenty-three
candidates would have been awarded the one lieutenant promotion and
which of the twelve sergeant candidates would have been awarded the
one sergeant promotion. 79 Accordingly, the court found the district
court's remedy to be "overly broad" because it had "treated each
bypassed candidate as if he had a one hundred percent probability of
receiving a promotion." ° The court determined that the officers should
all receive a pro rata division of the value of each promotion."1
Therefore, the twelve sergeant candidates were allowed to share, on a
pro rata basis, the value of the sergeant promotion, and the twenty-three
lieutenant candidates were allowed to share, on a pro rata basis, the
value of the lieutenant promotion. 2 The case was remanded for
83
further proceedings so that the revised remedy could be carried out.
II.

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967

A.

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof
As could reasonably be anticipated, the confusion between the burden
of proof and the burden of production of evidence that the Supreme
Court created in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks8 4 continued to spawn
most of the employment discrimination appeals reported during the
survey period. The bulk of these cases concerned the proper allocation
of the burden of proof among the parties in age discrimination litigation. 5
In Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 86 a grant of
summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's ADEA claim was
overturned on appeal.8 7 As with most burden-of-proof cases, the
Eleventh Circuit struggled to make sense of the distinction between
evidence of the prima facie case and evidence of pretext in the wake of
79. Id. at 1301-02.
80. Id. at 1300.
81. Id.
82. Id.

83. Id. at 1302.
84. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
85. The Supreme Court may eliminate much of this confusion when it decides Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (No. 99-536), which was argued on March 21, 2000.
Reeves may provide the trial courts with clearer direction on the correct standards for
applying Rules 50 and 56.
86. 196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999).
87. Id. at 1366.
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Hicks."8 Plaintiffs had been store managers at two stores acquired by
Fleming. Slightly more than a year after the acquisition, plaintiffs and
several other older, more experienced managers were terminated or
demoted and replaced by men who were younger and less experienced.
Subsequently, both plaintiffs were terminated. 9
The district court concluded that each plaintiff had failed to set forth
a prima facie case and that each had also failed to establish that the
nondiscriminatory reasons Fleming offered for their terminations were
pretexts for unlawful discrimination. 90 While agreeing with the district
court that neither plaintiff had offered any direct evidence of discrimination, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that each had established a prima
facie case of age discrimination based on circumstantial evidence. 9' To
establish a circumstantial case, plaintiffs must
initially satisfy a four-part prima facie requirement: (1) that she was
a member of the protected group of persons between the ages of forty
and seventy; (2) that she was subject to adverse employment actions;
(3) that a substantially younger person filled the position that she
sought or from which she was discharged; and (4) that she was
qualified to do the job for which she was rejected.92
The district court found that one plaintiff, Kanafani, had failed to
establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial evidence because
his replacement was thirty-seven years of age, while Kanafani was only
forty-two. The district court reasoned that this five-year age difference
was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case based on circumstantial
evidence.9" Relying on early authority holding that a three-year age
difference was sufficient to establish such a prima facie case, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed as to Kanafani.94 Additionally, the district
court concluded that neither plaintiff had satisfied the fourth element-that they were qualified to do the job for which they were
rejected.95 Again, the Eleventh Circuit was able to plumb the record

88. Id. at 1358-62. One commentator has argued that Hicks has changed the equation
in disparate treatment cases. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995).
89. 196 F.3d at 1358. There were two plaintiffs, Kanafani and Damon. Kanafani was
terminated for allegedly using profane language in the presence of customers, and Damon
was terminated for poor job performance. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1358-59.
92. Id. at 1359 (citing Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432 (11th
Cir. 1998)).
93. Id. at 1360.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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and infer from plaintiffs' long tenures in the positions they occupied
prior to being terminated that they were indeed qualified for those
jobs.96
As to the evidence of pretext, the Eleventh Circuit was again able to
discern from the record that plaintiffs had rebutted the nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by Fleming for their discharges.97 Fleming had
offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating both
plaintiffs (Kanafani had shouted vulgarities in front of customers, and
Damon was terminated for poor job performance).9"
Therefore, Appellants bore the burden of offering enough probative
evidence so that a reasonable jury might conclude that Fleming's
reasons for termination were a pretext for age discrimination. In the
summary judgment context, we conduct this inquiry by determining
whether a jury "could reasonably infer discrimination if the facts
presented [by Appellants] remain Unrebutted .... " After a painstaking review of the entire record, we find that Appellants have made this
requisite showing.'
Because material facts remained in dispute, summary judgment was
precluded." °
Mitchell v. USBI Co.' presented the Eleventh Circuit with another
issue regarding the burden of proof. In a per curiam opinion, the court
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant because
plaintiff failed to rebut the employer's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 1°2 The district court
concluded that plaintiff had not introduced any evidence to demonstrate
that the employer's proffered reason for its decision was pretextual, and
the Eleventh Circuit agreed. 3
The fifty-seven-year-old Mitchell had been terminated as part of a
reduction in force.'" In granting summary judgment for the employer,
the district court concluded that "USBI had engaged in a detailed

96. Id.
97. Id. at 1361. "Once a prima facie case is established, a defendant must proffer
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decision. If such reasons are
identified, a plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving them to be a pretext for
age discrimination." Id. (citing Turlington, 135 F.3d at 1432).
98. Id. at 1358.
99. Id. at 1361 (quoting Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996))
(citations omitted) (alteration in original).

100. Id. at 1366.
101. 186 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
102. Id. at 1356.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 1354.
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process of identifying candidates for layoff and explained why Mitchell
could not replace 20 less senior employees, with each written justification citing his lack of specific qualifications." °5 Mitchell put forth
several alternative arguments why USBI's proffered reason for not
allowing him to bump less senior employees-that he was not qualified
for any of their positions-was pretextual. None of his arguments
prevailed."°
Mitchell's most interesting assertion was that "comments by various
USBI employees demonstrate[d] a corporate culture conducive to age
discrimination."0 7 None of the individuals alleged to have made the
questionable statements were decision makers with respect to the
termination of Mitchell's employment.10 The court reaffirmed the rule
that "comments by non-decision makers do not raise an inference of
discrimination, especially if those statements are ambiguous."'
In Beaver v. Rayonier, Inc.," ° the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on
appeal a jury verdict for plaintiff."1 The court was asked to find that
the district court erred in denying defendant's motion for judgment as
a matter of law." 2 The court concluded that this argument had been
raised too late to be successful on appeal:
Because Rayonier failed to persuade the district court to dismiss the
action for lack of a prima facie case and proceeded to put on evidence
of a non-discriminatory reason-i.e., an economically induced RIF
[(reduction in force)]-for terminating Beaver, Rayonier's attempt to
persuade us to revisit whether Beaver established a prima facie case
is foreclosed by binding precedent." 3
"When the defendant fails to persuade the district court to dismiss the
action for lack of a prima facie case" and then puts forth evidence as to
the reason for the adverse employment action, "the factfinder must then
decide whether the [action] was discriminatory and the question of
whether4 plaintiff has made out a prima facie case is no longer relevant.""

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 1354-56.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id.
200 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 725.
Id.
Id. at 727.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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B.

ProceduralMatters
In last year's Article,"' we reported on the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents. ' In 1999 the sovereign
immunity question presented in Kimel was argued before the United
States Supreme Court. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court
affirmed that the ADEA does not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the
states."' In what is becoming an increasingly long line of sovereign
immunity decisions expanding on the Court's far-reaching decision in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,"' the Court concluded in Kimel
that the substantive requirements imposed on states and local governments by the ADEA are disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct
that could conceivably be targeted by the Act." 9 The Court held that
Congress did not have proper constitutional authority to abrogate the
states' immunity to age discrimination claims.' 2 °
Based upon Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
there were two requirements that had to be met before Congress could
properly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 12' First,
there had to be a clear legislative statement of congressional intent to
abrogate the immunity, and second, Congress must have done so under
proper constitutional authority.2 2 The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the first requirement had not been met because the court found
"[n]o unequivocal expression of an intent to abrogate immunity" in the
ADEA."' The Supreme Court agreed with that result, but not with
the Eleventh Circuit's rationale. The Supreme Court had no difficulty
finding that the ADEA contained a clear statement of congressional
intent to abrogate. 24 However, applying the "congruence and proportionality test,"'25 the Court concluded that the ADEA is not appropriate legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.'26
The Court

115.
116.

See Corbin & Ruth, supra note 27, at 993.
139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998).

117.

120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000).

118.
119.
120.
121.
state or
122.
123.
124.
125.

517 U.S. 44 (1996).
120 S. Ct. at 645.
Id. at 650.
139 F.3d at 1429. The Eleventh Amendment generally prohibits suits against a
its agencies in federal court. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
139 F.3d at 1430.
Id.
120 S.Ct. at 634.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997); Florida Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 2206 (1999).
126. 120 S.Ct. at 637.
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observed that "Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem. Congress
never identified any pattern of age discrimination by the States, much
less any discrimination
whatsoever that rose to the level of constitution127
al violation."

C. Attorney Fees
In Nance v. Maxwell Federal Credit Union,128 the Eleventh Circuit
determined that a plaintiff who succeeds on the merits of an ADEA
claim but fails to prove injury based upon such discriminatory conduct,
12
is not a prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney fees.
Nance had been a branch manager for Maxwell. Her job performance
proved to be unsatisfactory, and Nance was informed that she either had
to accept a demotion or resign and receive severance pay. Rather than
accept either alternative, however, Nance elected to take a leave of
absence. She never returned to work or communicated her intentions to
Maxwell. Maxwell continued Nance on full salary and benefits for a
time and then placed her on unpaid leave. For some reason (perhaps as
presuit strategy), Maxwell changed its mind and asked Nance to return
to her branch manager position as soon as possible. The offer was
repeatedly communicated to Nance over several months until her
position was filled. Nance was informed that if she ever wished to
return, Maxwell would place her in a comparable position. Nance
responded by filing suit. A jury returned a verdict for Nance, finding
that Maxwell had discriminated against her on the basis of her age.
Based upon the verdict, the district court awarded front pay, back pay,
and attorney fees. Maxwell appealed, contending that because Nance
was unable to show any injury as a matter of law, she was not entitled
to any front pay or back pay.' The Eleventh Circuit agreed.' 3'
The ADEA does not contain fee-shifting language. 3 2 However, the
court concluded that an ADEA plaintiff must "prevail" to be entitled to
attorney fees.'
To prevail the plaintiff must obtain an enforceable

127. Id. at 648-49.
128. 186 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
129. Id. at 1339.
130. Id. at 1339-40.
131. Id. at 1342.
132. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1997) (concerning attorney fees in civil
rights actions brought under various statutes), with 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b) (West 1999)
(concerning attorney fees in ADEA actions).
133. 186 F.3d at 1343; see also Salvatori v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 190 F.3d 1244,
1245 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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judgment against the defendant.13 4 Nance failed to prove injury at
trial because Maxwell had not taken any adverse employment action
against her and because she failed to seek any damages other than front
Because she had not been the victim of any
pay and back pay. 3
adverse employment action based upon her age, the court vacated the
district court's award of front pay and back pay.'36 As a result,
plaintiff had not obtained an enforceable judgment and thus had not
prevailed as that term is used in other civil rights contexts: "Because
[the court] vacated the plaintiff's damages awarded, there [was] nothing
in the judgment that [could] be enforced."' 37
III.
A.

AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990

Theories of Liability and Burdens of Proof

During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit reported two noteworthy cases regarding burdens of proof under the ADA. In Hilburn v.
Murata Electronics North America, Inc.," summary judgment for the
employer was again the issue. The district court granted summary
judgment for defendant, and Hilburn appealed. On appeal Hilburn
argued that Murata had failed to promote her, failed to transfer her,
wrongfully terminated her employment, and declined to rehire her
because of her disability and the disabilities of certain members of her
family. The district court concluded that Hilburn was not qualified for
the position that she sought through rehire because of her undisputed
record of excessive absences from work occasioned by her and her
family's health problems during her initial course of employment by
Murata. The district court also concluded that Hilburn had failed to
demonstrate a factual issue as to whether she, her son, or her husband
was disabled within the meaning of the ADA.' 39 On appeal the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court, concluding that Hilburn
had failed to demonstrate that her heart condition rendered her
disabled.' 40
The most interesting aspect of Hilburn's case was her associational
discrimination claims. Hilburn asserted that Murata had also discrimi-

134. 186 F.3d at 1343 (citing Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992)).
135. Id. at 1342. The court noted that Nance could have been entitled to other forms
of damages but those claims had not been raised in the district court. Id. at 1342 n.9.
136. Id. at 1342.
137. Id. at 1343.
138.

181 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999).

139. Id. at 1230.
140. Id. at 1225-30.
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nated against her because of her association with both her son (who had
a history of cancer and suffered from a hearing loss and a learning
impairment) and with her husband (who suffered from acute pancreatitis
and diabetes).,
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court
that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of association
discrimination.142 Because Hilburn failed to meet Murata's attendance
requirements while employed, the court concluded that she was not
qualified for the new job at the time she applied for rehire and that,
therefore, her associational claims also failed."
"Additionally, the
Hartog case is instructive because it recognized the ADA distinction that
'[i]f [a non-disabled employee] violates a neutral employer policy
concerning attendance or tardiness, he or she may be dismissed even if
the reason for the absence or tardiness is to care for the [disabled
associate].'"' 44
Griffin v. GTE Florida, Inc."5 also concerned a grant of summary
judgment for a defendant-employer. Griffin brought a retaliation claim
under the ADA against his former employer. The district court granted
GTE's motion for summary judgment, finding that Griffin had failed to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation."
The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.'4 7 "To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff
must show: (1) statutorily protected expression; (2) adverse employment
action; and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and the
adverse action.'"' 4 Griffin alleged that GTE had retaliated against
him for filing charges of disability and age discrimination by constructively discharging him from employment. 149 The court concluded that
Griffin had failed to establish a causal connection between his discharge

141. Id. at 1230.
142. Id. at 1230-31.
In order to establish a prima facie case under this "association discrimination*
theory, Hilburn must establish the following elements: (1) she was subjected to
an adverse employment action, (2) she was qualified for the job at that time, (3)
she was known by Murata at the time to have a relative with a disability, and (4)
the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances which raised a
reasonable inference that the disability of the relative was a determining factor
in Murata's decision.
Id. (citing Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1231 (quoting Hartog, 129 F.3d at 1083) (alterations in original).
145. 182 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
146. Id. at 1281.

147. Id. at 1284.
148. Id. at 1281 (quoting Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d
1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 1997)).

149. Id. at 1282.
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and the protected conduct and, therefore, failed to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation.150 Griffin failed to adduce any evidence
indicating that the harassment he complained of worsened after he
complained about it.'5 '
B.

Coverage
The Supreme Court decided five cases during the survey period that
concerned the scope of the ADA. In the first, Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corp.,"52 the Court ruled that a plaintiff's receipt
of Social Security disability insurance benefits does not (standing alone)
estop her from maintaining an employment discrimination claim under
the ADA. 5 ' In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,5 the Court concluded that the ADA requires the states to provide mentally-disabled
persons55 with community-based, rather than institution-based, treatment. 1

The Court's decisions in Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,'56 Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc.,157 and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 58
are also important in understanding the scope of the ADA. In Kirkingburg the Court concluded that employers may rely on basic safety
standards even though those standards may tend to exclude individuals
with disabilities.'59 Sutton and Murphy both addressed the meaning
of the term "disability" within the context of the ADA. In Sutton the
Court held that pilots with correctable vision are not disabled," 8 and
in Murphy the Court held that individuals with high blood pressure
treatable with medication are likewise not disabled. 1 '
C.

Sovereign Immunity
In a case of first impression, FloridaParaplegicAss'n v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Florida,6 2 the Eleventh Circuit was asked to decide

150. Id. at 1283.
151. Id. Indeed, the court determined that the offending supervisor made efforts to
better his behavior after learning of Griffin's complaints. Id. at 1284.
152. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 797-98.
119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
Id. at 2178.
119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
119 S. Ct. at 2173-74.
119 S. Ct. at 2143.
119 S. Ct. at 2137.
166 F.3d 1126 (11th Cir. 1999).
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whether Title III of the ADA 16 creates a private cause of action
against Indian tribes that fail to comply with the public accommodations
provisions of the ADA. The court concluded that Congress had not
abrogated tribal sovereign immunity with respect to the ADA so as to
allow private suits against Indian tribes.'
Plaintiffs, who were disability rights activists, filed suit against the
Miccosukee Tribe, alleging that the Tribe's bingo and gaming facility was
not accessible to the disabled.'65 The court noted that "as Indian tribes
...become more integrated into the mainstream," the notions of Indian
sovereignty become more difficult to maintain." "Indian sovereignty
has deep historical roots, however, and the presumption that tribes
should not be subjected to lawsuits in state or federal court remains as
strong today as ever."'
Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Board of Trustees,'6 presented yet another immunity question. The case involved
two consolidated appeals challenging grants of summary judgment on
sovereign immunity grounds. 69 In an extensive decision buttressed by
its earlier decision in Kimel,7 ° the court concluded that the states are
not immune from suit under either the ADA or Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973."' Unlike in Kimel, here the court deterTribe test were met by congressiomined that both parts of the7 Seminole
2
nal enactment of the ADA.1

D. Preemption
Doe v. Stincer" presented the Eleventh Circuit with the question
of whether federally-authorized protection and advocacy organizations
have standing to challenge state laws limiting access to mental health
records. Doe had initially sued the Florida Attorney General, a hospital,
163. Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against any individual "on the basis
of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who

owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation."

42 U.S.C.

§ 12182(a).

164. 166 F.3d at 1135.
165. Id. at 1127. Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint a variety of barriers to
accessibility within the gaming facility and a restaurant owned by the Tribe. Id.
166. Id. at 1135.
167. Id.
168. 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 1999).
169. Id. at 1216.
170. See supra Part II.B.
171. 193 F.3d at 1219.
172. Id. at 1218.
173.

175 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 1999).
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and two psychiatrists, claiming that their refusal to provide her with
access to her mental health medical records violated the ADA and that
a Florida statute permitting them to do so was preempted by the
ADA. 17 4 Doe was subsequently joined in the suit by the Advocacy
Center, which is "a federally-authorized protection and advocacy
organization established under the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally
Ill Individuals Act ("PAMII"), 42 U.S.C. Section 10801, and the
Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act ("PAIR"), 29 U.S.C.
Section 794e."175 The district court found the Florida law to be
preempted by the ADA and enjoined the statute. The Attorney General
appealed, contending that the Advocacy Center did not have standing to
sue. 176 Finding that the record did not support the Center's standing,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated the injunction and remanded the case to
the district court to afford the Center an opportunity to establish standing.177 The court indicated that the Center would be able to establish
standing but that it simply had failed to do so below. 17
E. Procedure
Again, a plaintiff was appealing a grant of summary judgment for his
former employer in Zillyette v. Capital One Financial Corp.179 The
district court granted Capital One's motion for summary judgment,
holding that Zillyette's cause of action was time-barred because he failed
to file suit within ninety days of the EEOC's issuance of a right-to-sue
letter. In fact, the ninety-day period had already run when the postal
service first attempted to deliver the right-to-sue letter to plaintiff.8
While acknowledging that timeliness issues are subject to case-by-case
review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that under the circumstances
presented, the district court was correct in ruling that the ninety-day
filing period had expired before plaintiff brought suit and that, therefore,
Zillyette's claim was time-barred. 8 '
Zillyette, proceeding pro se, failed to retrieve timely a certified letter
from the EEOC after being notified at least twice by the United States

174. Id. at 881-82. Florida law provides hospital patients with a right to obtain their
medical records but it does not apply to records maintained by psychiatric facilities. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 395.3025 (West Supp. 2000).
175. 175 F.3d at 881.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 888.
178. Id. at 885-88.
179. 179 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 1999).
180. Id. at 1338-39.
181. Id. at 1341.
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Postal Service that a letter from the EEOC was at the post office.18 2
Because the notification clearly indicated that the certified letter was
from the EEOC, the court concluded that Zillyette "had the de minimus
responsibility to retrieve the letter in a timely manner or provide a
reasonable explanation as to why this was not done. To hold otherwise
would permit him simply to defer the retrieval of the letter and thus to
manipulate the 90-day time lmit." 's3
F

Reasonable Accommodation

Summary judgment for the defendant-employer in a reasonableaccommodation dispute was at issue in Gaston v. Bellingrath Gardens
& Home, Inc."S Gaston had failed to request a reasonable accommodation after being informed that new job requirements, which she was
unable to fulfill without that accommodation, were being imposed on her
position. When informed of the new job requirements, Gaston told her
supervisor only that she could not meet those requirements and then
resigned without any further explanation. Gaston did not request any
form of reasonable accommodation."8 5 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for the employer,
concluding that plaintiff's failure to demand a reasonable accommodation
after being shown the86 new job requirements precluded her disability
discrimination claim.1
G.

Medical Examinations

In another instructive decision, Watson v. City of Miami Beach,"7
the district court granted summary judgment for the employer in a
dispute involving the permissible scope of medical examinations under
the ADA. Watson had been a Miami Beach police officer for a number
of years. He refused to participate in a mandatory, department-wide
testing program for tuberculosis because the examination required him
to disclose his HIV/AIDS status. When Watson became rude and
unreasonable with the medical staff over the examination and the.
related mandatory disclosure, he was thought to be acting irrationally
and was ordered to undergo a fitness for duty evaluation. Watson

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1339.
Id. at 1341.
167 F.3d 1361 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1364.
177 F.3d 932 (11th Cir. 1999).
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thereafter sued, alleging that both the fitness for duty and the tuberculosis examinations were prohibited medical inquiries under the ADA.188
The ADA provides that
[a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not
make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an
individual with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the
disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.189

The district court found both examinations to be job-related and
consistent with business necessity and therefore granted summary
judgment for the City.'" The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, because in
the context
of law-enforcement employment, such tests are job-relat1
ed.

19

H.

PresuitArbitration

Weaver v. Florida Power & Light Co.'92 concerned the ability to
arbitrate ADA claims. Weaver sued Florida Power & Light ("FPL"),
claiming sex and handicap discrimination. Prior to bringing suit,
however, she had filed grievances under the collective bargaining
agreement in effect between her union and her employer. The district
court dismissed certain claims on the merits. The Eleventh Circuit
affirmed that decision on appeal. As to Weaver's remaining claims, FPL
moved the district court to enjoin the arbitration principally on the
grounds of res judicata. Concluding that an injunction was necessary to
protect the integrity of its judgment, the district court
enjoined plaintiff
193
and her union from proceeding with the arbitration.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court
abused its discretion by enjoining the arbitration proceedings because
FPL had an adequate remedy at law." FPL had principally contended on appeal that "the remedy available through arbitration [was] not
adequate because pursuing such a remedy would force it to undergo
expensive and time-consuming adversarial proceedings that could be
avoided by the issuance of an injunction."'95 The court reasoned that
FPL could have made its res judicata arguments "before the arbitrators

188. Id. at 934.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
190. 177 F.3d at 934.
191.
192.

Id. at 935.
172 F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 1999).

193.

Id. at 772-73.

194.
195.

Id. at 775.
Id. at 774.
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at the outset of the arbitration proceeding" and that doing so "would be
no more costly... than prosecuting a motion for injunctive relief in the

district court."'"
I.

Attorney Fees

Not surprisingly, a number of ADA cases involving attorney fees
reached the Eleventh Circuit during the survey period. In Bruce v. City
of Gainesville,97 the court adopted the Christiansburgtest i s8 as the
proper standard to be applied in assessing attorney fees under the
ADA. 19 Interestingly, although the district court had applied Christiansburg and awarded the City of Gainesville attorney fees as a
prevailing party under that test, the Eleventh Circuit reversed in a split
decision.2 ° In his dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Magill was convinced
that plaintiff had failed to establish the fundamental elements required
to make out a prima facie case and that his claims were, therefore,
lacking in arguable merit so as to be groundless and without foundation.2° '
Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff's Office20 2 presented another
permutation of the interesting question of what constitutes a prevailing
party for purposes of an award of attorney fees. While losing on most of
his ADA and ADEA claims, Barnes had successfully challenged the
county's use of pre-employment psychological testing. The district court
concluded that the examination process used by Broward County was
impermissible under the ADA and permanently enjoined the county from
continuing to conduct pre-employment psychological or physical
examinations. Plaintiff subsequently moved for an award of attorney
fees as a prevailing party as to that issue.2"3 The Eleventh Circuit
framed the question on appeal as "whether a plaintiff who seeks and
obtains injunctive relief pursuant to the [ADA] is entitled to attorney's
fees when that relief does not benefit the plaintiff directly."20 4 The
court then answered the question in the negative:
Despite the fact that the court granted injunctive relief with respect to
the County's use of pre-employment psychological testing, there is

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 774-75.
177 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 1999).
See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 417-22 (1978).
177 F.3d at 952.
Id.
Id. at 953 (Magill, J., dissenting).
190 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1275-76 (citation omitted).
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neither evidence that this change in policy affected the relationship
between Barnes and the County at the time judgment was rendered,
nor any indication that Barnes directly benefitted from the injunction.
As alluded to by the Supreme Court in Hewitt, the fact that Barnes
conceivably could benefit from the court's order prohibiting the
referenced examinations if he ever chose in the future to re-apply to
the sheriff's office for a job is not adequate to render him a prevailing
party with respect to this litigation.0 5
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866 AND 1871
A.

Section 1981

Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local Union No.
1996206 addressed the availability of the mixed-motives defense in
cases involving Section 1981 claims. The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that the 1991 amendments to Title VII, which limited the impact of the
mixed-motives defense, do not apply to Section 1981.207 The court
reasoned (1) that the 1991 amendments added two provisions to Title
VII but that these provisions did not affect Section 1981, and (2) that the
portion of the 1991 amendments that amended Section 1981 did not
mention the mixed-motives defense.20 8
Some of Macon, Georgia's dirty political business reached the Eleventh
Circuit during the survey period. In Bishop v. Avera, 20 9 the court
concluded that Macon's police chief was entitled to qualified immunity
in a reverse discrimination suit filed against him by his former deputy
chief.21 ° The former deputy chief, who is white, sued the police chief,
the city, and the mayor, claiming that he was unlawfully demoted and
replaced with a less-qualified black deputy chief to fulfill a campaign
promise made by the mayor during an election. Avera argued that
because the deputy chief was an at-will employee, he did not have a
contractual employment relationship and, therefore, could not sustain a
claim under Section 1981.211 While acknowledging that there is case
law supporting both sides of the question, the court concluded there was

205. Id. at 1278.
206. 176 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 1999).
207. Id. at 1358.
208. Id. at 1357-58.
209. 177 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1999).
210. Id. at 1236.
211. Id. at 1234-35. Section 1981 provides a cause of action for racial discrimination
in the making and enforcing of contracts. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 176-78 (1989).
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neither controlling Eleventh Circuit nor Supreme Court precedent on
point: "Considering the confusion in the law on this issue at the time of
Avera's actions, we cannot say that his conduct was clearly unlawful in
light of the preexisting law governing claims under Section 1981."212
In Ferrill v. The ParkerGroup, Inc.,213 the Eleventh Circuit declined
to adopt a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense based
on race in Section 1981 actions.2 14 The court affirmed that the BFOQ
and business necessity defenses are not available to defendants accused
of intentional racial discrimination in violation of Section 1981.215
B.

Section 1983

Macuba v. Deboer216 presented both absolute and qualified immunity
questions on appeal. Macuba had alleged that Charlotte County, Florida
and two of its county commissioners had abolished his position by
reorganizing county administrative departments and by denying him
another position because of his whistle blowing and free speech
activities. The two county commissioners moved for summary judgment
on the claims against them in their individual capacities, contending
they were immune from suit under the doctrines of absolute and
qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion, and they
2 17
brought an interlocutory appeal.
The Eleventh Circuit determined that Macuba's claims were based
upon two events:
The first event was the abolition of Macuba's position as License
Inspector in the Building Department. Macuba contend[ed] that the
Board of Commissioners abolished this position because [defendants]
wanted to punish him; the need to reorganize the land use departments
was simply a pretext. The second event was the county's refusal to
hire Macuba for either of two newly-created positions for which he applied.21
The court ruled that the county commissioners were entitled to absolute
immunity with respect to the reorganization event and to qualified

212. 177 F.3d at 1236.
213. 168 F.3d 468 (11th Cir. 1999).
214. Id. at 475. Arguably, the Seventh Circuit created a limited racial BFOQ defense
in Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918-21 (7th Cir. 1996).

215. 168 F.3d at 474.
216. 193 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1999).
217. Id. at 1317-20. A denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim is
immediately appealable to the extent that it involves questions of law. Behrens v.
Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996).

218.

193 F.3d at 1320.
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immunity with respect to the refusal to hire event.219 County commissions, like other local legislative bodies, enjoy absolute immunity when
exercising functions within the "'sphere of legitimate legislative
activity.'" 220 The court observed that the reorganization of the administrative departments of a county government is a function squarely
within that sphere.221
With respect to the failure to hire event, the court concluded that
Macuba had failed to show that the county commissioners had anything
at all to do with the decision not to hire him.222 Observing that under
the county charter, commissioners are prohibited from interfering with
employees supervised by the county administrator, the court determined
that Macuba had produced no evidence to indicate that the commissioners had ever contacted the decision maker or in any way attempted to
influence the decision making process. 23
The court's extensive discussion of the proper consideration of hearsay
statements in passing on motions for summary judgment is worthy of
study. The court observed that "[slome courts, including our own,
appear to have restated the general rule to hold that a district court may
consider a hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary
judgment if the statement could be reduced to admissible evidence at
trial or reduced to admissible form."2 24 Finding that the district court,
in denying the county commissioners' qualified immunity defense, had
relied upon inadmissible hearsay statements that could never be reduced
to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form, the court
reversed with instructions to the district court that it should enter
judgment for defendants in their individual capacities on plaintiff's First
Amendment claim.225

219.
220.

Id. at 1321, 1325.
Id. at 1320 (quoting Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
221. Id. at 1321. To the extent that the commissioners were absolutely immune for
their reorganization decisions, the motives underlying their decisions were irrelevant. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1322.
224. Id. at 1323 (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. Id. at 1325.

